Nietzsche's Übermensch is not über Alles
PhaenEx
Nietzsche clearly distinguishes between those who belong to the category of "wir freien Geister " (Kritische 62; vol. 5, sec. 44 ) and the unique and genuine "free spirits par excellence." There is a qualitative leap from the first type to the second, not merely a quantitative difference of being more free in more fields of life and thought. These "very free spirits ... will not be merely free spirits but something more, higher, greater, and thoroughly different" (Beyond sec. 44). In contradistinction to those few sublime figures, "we spirits" are just "their heralds and precursors." 2 But the main difference between both types is not that the first are just the "heralds" of the second; rather it lies in the dependence of "we free spirits" on culture and society. Even if Nietzsche strove to overcome most of the "modern ideas" and ideologies that prevailed in his time, he admits that "even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine" (Science sec. 344). And even if Nietzsche did his utmost to overcome his cultural-philosophical heritage, he needed it as the object of his overcoming. Thus, he was dialectically dependent upon this very heritage.
In Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Nietzsche suggests that the highly developed spiritual and intellectual component of power may weaken even the most superior personality. Individuals who are genuinely free and independent are unlikely to adhere to any rigid and inflexible set of norms: the values they possess are constantly open to examination and susceptible to being "overcome." Their freedom from any given tradition induces a kind of vulnerability, and they are susceptible to manipulation and exploitation:
Compared with him who has tradition on his side and requires no reasons for his actions, the free spirit is always weak, especially in actions; for he is aware of too many motives and points of view and therefore possesses an uncertain and unpracticed hand. What means are there of nonetheless rendering him relatively strong? How does the strong spirit come into being? (Human vol. 1, sec. 230 ).
The problem may be recast as that of turning purely spiritual power into a concrete historical force: is it possible to preserve the spirit of Hamlet in the body of Faust? Nietzsche's solution focuses on the social fabric, which is woven with religious and moral dogmas, and which produces a psychological pattern of guilt, asceticism, ressentiment, and bad conscience. All of them are responsible for the corruption of spiritual power and cultural achievements. And Nietzsche wanted to weaken, or in his words to "freeze" these destructive manifestations of human psyche in order to pave the way for genuine freedom, personal authenticity and positive, mature and creative spiritual power.
3 However, by emphasizing these elements, Nietzsche admits that there can be no absolute autonomy; even the most powerful are not impervious to the influence of the environment with which they interact. The revaluation of prevalent cultural norms is essential to the evolution of the psychology of the Übermensch because even the arena of the "authentic legislator" is penetrated by environmental values and forces. Hence it becomes clear that the Übermensch type is essentially different from that of the "free spirit par excellence." The latter, namely the absolutely autonomous will to power, is therefore no more than a regulative ideal -one that provides the model for approximation, but which can in principle never be fully realized in human society.
It follows that Nietzsche, dependent upon the tradition he strove to overcome and conscious of his dependence, could not honestly regard himself as a "free spirit par excellence," i.e., as absolutely independent of any historical and cultural context which hovers, as it were, above the contemporary manifestations of social ethos and modes of thought.
Nietzsche clearly perceives himself to belong solely to the category of "we spirits." What this means is that Nietzsche delineated an essential distinction between the human free spirits like himself and a few others, and the ideal free spirit, which he calls the "free spirit par excellence." Moreover, "we free spirits" are not equal to the spirit of the Übermensch who, like the free spirit par excellence, personifies the qualitative jump from being a humanely free spirit to manifesting it in an übermenschlich way.
The type "we free spirits" thus indicates a humanely possible stage on the way to becoming the Übermensch but in no way can its members attain the highest status of the free spirit par excellence. This Nietzschean intuition is also expressed in the grammatically plural "we," in contradistinction to the singular "spirit par excellence. One cannot find in Nietzsche's writings a similar statement about the possibility that in the future people who manifest the patterns of the "free spirit par excellence" will emerge.
The free spirit par excellence does not need society for its cultivation and sustenance. It emerges spontaneously by the power of its mental resources and by sheer luck. It resembles the Spinozistic causa sui and hence it is this figure, rather than the figure of the Übermensch, that must emerge after the "death of God." After pronouncing that "God is dead," it is to this ideal that Nietzsche refers when he exclaims: "Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?" (Science 125). The essential difference between the Übermensch and the "free spirit par excellence" is clear in Justice ... is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an `understanding' by means of a settlement -and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves (sec. 8).
Nietzsche argues that the powerful individual is characterized by egoism. This emphasis on the egoism of genuine mental power, however, does not prevent Nietzsche from continuing to describe the moral and social network of powerful individuals who would willingly and freely enter the restrictive social framework. In Beyond Good and Evil (sec. 264) , for example,
Nietzsche declares that recognition of the value and freedom of others originates in egoism.
Only an individual who freely expresses an abundance of positive power and a firm selfhood is able to grant similar rights and freedoms to all those who are recognized by him as equals.
He or she is not afraid that this might diminish or destroy his or her own power. It is self-affirmation and the confidence in one's power and virtues that enables the affirmation of "others" and their uniqueness. In Nietzsche's eyes, human egoism and the emphasis on selfhood do not contradict the moral order; they actually create the ideal conditions for its proper functioning.
At this point a question arises: why do the powerful need a society at all? Is it not the case that the need of others indicates weakness and insufficiency? In answer, one may point out that the powerful person is not identical with an omnipotent and absolutely perfect God, capable of functioning fully and freely apart from his creation. There is no upper limit to power and there is no optimum for absolute autarchy and self-sufficiency. Moreover, cultural enterprises require the association and collaboration of various creative powers, each contributing its distinct capacities to the common enterprise. To make the social manifestation of power possible, any creation, even the most individual, needs the social fabric and the mutual exchange of ideas and concepts. There is no power without creation and form giving, and there is no creation without society. Hence there is no power without society, and its essential manifestations are impossible if there is a complete severance from the social context. 4 Furthermore, since absolute power never actually "exists," and since there is no creation ex nihilo, persons possessing positive powers, namely "we free spirits" (and this includes, by extrapolation, the Übermenschen) need each other, and need society and culture as the vital working framework within which they create. Obviously society itself also requires moral patterns that organize and consolidate it. Nietzsche, then, is not a negating "nihilist" who wishes to overthrow society and go beyond its limits. The "Antichrist" within him does not turn him into an anarchist, nor does it make him immoral. This is especially due to his anthropological concept of "Macht."
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Because of the unattainable ideality of the "free spirit par excellence," Nietzsche dwells more on the figure of the Übermensch. However, he believes that it is necessary to introduce the first type as well because in this way he provides the upper limit, which, though unattainable by humans, may endow with some degree of viable credibility his other more attainable ideals: those of the Overman and the authentically powerful person. And thus the ideal of "the free spirit par excellence" is used to give his readers the sense that the other ideals, which are less lofty, are indeed within their reach. The genuinely powerful persons and the Übermensch become realizable and the readers' sense of their viability is aroused by PhaenEx specific descriptions of their modes, especially those that portray the feasible patterns of "we free spirits."
Nietzsche's descriptions of the antithesis to "we free spirits" in Beyond Good and Evil indicate that these "falsely so-called 'free spirits'" are "eloquent and prolific";
"scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its 'modern ideas,'" they seek "the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and easier life for everyone." They most often exhibit their worry for "equality of rights" and sympathy for all that suffers" (sec. 44). The fact that Nietzsche provides antitheses to "we free spirits"
and to the figure of the Übermensch (in the figure of "the last man," e.g., in "Zarathustra's
Prologue," Zarathustra sec. 5), but does not find it necessary to do so in respect of the "free spirit par excellence," is yet more evidence of the latter's essentially unique nature.
III. Negative versus positive power patterns
To clarify the exact standing of the category of "we free spirits" within Nietzschean anthropological philosophy I will now present in a nutshell his distinction between two basic patterns of persons -one deriving from the existence of positive power and another from its absence:
There are recipes for the feeling of power (Gefühle der Macht), firstly for those who can control themselves and who are thereby accustomed to a feeling of power; [and secondly] for those in whom precisely this is lacking (Daybreak sec. 65, my italics).
Consequently, he describes two distinct psychological types who manifest their respective kinds of power in everyday patterns of life and intellectual activity. This (at first)
anthropological principle and its two diametrically opposed manifestations are the ground for his evaluations of human beings. Thus Nietzsche posits two basic patterns of moral behavior:
one deriving from the existence of positive power and another from its absence (allied with the will to achieve it). The will to attain power always lies beneath the surface of all the spiritual expressions of humanity.
We should note, however, that his distinction between negative and positive powers is Nietzsche speaks here about a "spirit" detached from anything whatsoever, clearly he is thinking about the more ideal type of the "free spirit," namely the free spirit par excellence.
Let us not forget that Nietzsche hardly ever promoted any ideal of nationality in his writings and reacted to the idea of a totalitarian modern state as to "the coldest of all cold monsters." 7 He was against nationalism (of the Bismarckian kind) and tried to promote a supra-national culturally united Europe. Hence it follows that in his warning to Paneth he had in mind the whole cultural-historical context of a people, not solely the Jewish one.
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In any case, Nietzsche admits here that the "free spirits par excellence" are more than not communicative; they are also "dangerous and destructive." Destructive toward themselves -i.e., self-destructive -and crucially they are dangerous to others. He admits here that "free spirits par excellence" cannot establish a viable society and cannot enter into meaningful interactions with other people, especially with types of their own kind. Hence, once again, we reach the conclusion that a society that consists mainly or entirely of "free spirits par excellence" cannot be a viable one.
We must bear in mind that even Nietzsche was not a pure Nietzschean. His ideal type, the a-historical "free spirit par excellence" was solely a regulative ideal. The ideal was, among other things, a means to provide an antidote to the tendency of Germans to fill the existential void incurred by the death of (belief in) God by embracing extreme ideological and political substitutes (like Communism or Nationalism). By means of this ideal he strove to fight the dangerous Hegelian and historicist tendencies prevalent in contemporary German culture. In his essay "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," he did not object to the use of the past for the service of life in the present. He argued only against a past that overpowers the present and annihilates any of its novel and vital elements, so that, inter alia, it also destroys the future. More vitality and less historicity was his prescription in this essay. For Nietzsche "we free spirits" are not individuals who act in an a-historical vacuum, or a kind of existential tabula rasa without memories, identity, or sensibilities rooted in their culture, heritage, and people. Nietzsche did not believe that one could succeed in severing all his or her linkages with previous history. 9 He only attacked the popular illusion that it was possible to detach oneself completely from tradition, to become a "free spirit" by rejecting one's entire past. For psychological reasons Nietzsche did not believe that such a "liberation" was even feasible, let alone desirable. He was not at all reluctant to oppose either the metaphysical traditions of the past or the accepted Christian ethic. But neither did he profess to be a nihilist or seek a complete break with the past and its values. Nor was he a radical revolutionary, freed of the restraints of tradition, and descending into the historical arena from an a-temporal, a-historical pinnacle.
Nietzsche's commitment was to a path of self-transformation that is arduous and painstaking; for him the rigors of self-education and the anguish of self-conquest constitute 
VI. Conclusion
To clarify the above I will draw an analogy with the domain of psychoanalysis. If neurosis is, as Freud claimed, a natural outcome of repressive society, and if society is necessarily founded upon repression, can we imagine a society where there are no repressed -i.e., neurotic -people? This question remains valid even for a society in which all neurotic individuals have successfully undergone psychoanalytic treatment. For when they try to live in society under more or less the same conditions that caused their neurosis in the first place, will they not regress to some degree? The same considerations are relevant with respect to the individual whose quest for authenticity or for optimal positive power -in the form of the Übermensch -is supposedly finally fulfilled. Since such a person continues to be a member of society, the processes of social conditioning and the assault from within on one's 'pure power' will continue to exert their anti authenticating and weakening effects. Hence the struggles to attain personal authenticity or the Übermensch status face what seems to be a paradoxical situation: these lofty ideals cannot be materialized without society, but neither can they be lived within its framework. PhaenEx
Nietzsche was well aware of the difficulty of trying to allow for the 'ought' of the übermenschlich authenticity within the social 'is.' The fact is that he leaves this issue intentionally vague in the closing sentence of Zarathustra, where Zarathustra, who personifies the ideal of personal authenticity, leaves his "cave" in order to do … what? To return to society? It is far from clear: "thus spoke Zarathustra, and he left his cave, glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains." The explicit presence of the "sun" implies that Zarathustra, not being able to become part of the human-social nexus, is like the sun, which not being part of the earth, only warms it from above. Hence Zarathustra can only inspire us to try and become authentic, to be freer than we are, to be mentally and intellectually more powerful and creative than we are at present.
Notes
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